Concealment and Non-Disclosure of Quality-Related Defects in Contracts by Bissell, James T.
CONCEALMENT AND NON-DISCLOSURE  
OF QUALITY-RELATED DEFECTS 
IN CONTRACTS
Ja m es  D. Bissell*
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of  this paper is two-fold. The first is to examine 
the ancient but relatively unexplored com m on  law rules o f  conceal­
ment o f  quality-re la ted  defects. These rules apply equally to every­
day consum er contrac ts  for the purchase and sale o f  goods, as they 
do  to contracts  for a business opportun ity  or for the sale o f  real es­
tate. This paper  is concerned with the concealm ent or non-disclosure 
o f  m ateria l facts and defects in goods and property  which do not 
becom e a par t  of  the implied or express te rm s o f  the final contract.  
A study of  the com m on  law reveals, perhaps surprisingly, tha t  many 
o f  the tactics em ployed by businessmen and even private sellers to in­
duce a cus tom er  to buy before forming an independent opinion as to 
the quality o r  value of  the goods or property ,  may constitu te  
f raudulent concealm ent,  entitling the buyer to an action in deceit for 
d am ages  and rescission. However, in their a t tem p t  to in troduce a 
degree o f  conscionability into the bargaining process, the courts  have 
not forgotten the maxim  caveat emptor. Therefore, the com m on law 
has reached a point in its developm ent where a ra the r  a rb it ra ry  dis­
tinction is d raw n between the m ere failure to disclose defects which 
the buyer obviously does not know exist and active steps taken to 
prevent discovery o f  those defects. Only the la tte r  course o f  conduct 
is actionable.
The secondary purpose of  this paper is to exam ine the a r ­
tificiality o f  the distinction between non-disclosure and active con­
cea lm en t and to look at recent s ta tu to ry  reform s in the area  o f  dis­
closure. It is submitted tha t  a duty  to disclose known existing 
m ater ia l  defects would p rom ote  the interests o f  establishing con ­
scionability in contracting  while still m ainta in ing the desired aims of  
c e r ta in ty  an d  finality .  This has already been achieved to a con ­
siderable extent in the com m on law of  most o f  the U nited  States.
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While it is beyond the scope o f  this paper  to exam ine the area  of  
sta tu tory  reform it should be noted tha t  the need for s tronger dis­
closure requirem ents has been felt by m any legislators in the United 
S ta tes  and C a nada ,  and elsewhere, where higher s tandards  o f  con­
duct have been imposed and new kinds o f  relief established by 
legislation which is a im ed at either the regulation o f  specific trades 
or at the sale o f  goods generally .1
P A R T  O N E
C O N C E A L M E N T  A N D  D IS C L O S U R E  O F  
Q U A L IT Y -R E L A T E D  D E F E C T S :
T H E  C O M M O N  LAW
I. T H E  R IG H T  T O  R E M A IN  S IL E N T
The com m on  law m axim  caveat em p to r  is still very much a part 
of  the law o f  contracts .  Its vitality is especially grea t with respect to 
private sales and sales o f  specific goods where the buyer has been af­
forded an opportun ity  to inspect the goods and is therefore deemed 
to have taken them subject to any apparen t,  or patent,  defect.2 The 
purpose of  this paper is to exam ine this m axim  as it relates firstly to 
the duty  to disclose, and secondly the duty not to conceal, defects go­
ing to the quality  o f  the subject m a tte r  in contracts  for the sale o f  
goods. Essentially, the risk of  all defects in goods falls upon the 
buyer3 unless (a) the  seller has expressly assumed the risk by a te rm  
of the con trac t  or  a representation; or (b) if there is an implied condi­
tion or  w arran ty  under the New Brunswick Sale o f  Goods A ct*  The 
Sale o f  Goods A ct has severe limitations upon its scope because 
most of  the implied term s relating to quality are restricted to sales 
m ade  in the ord inary  course o f  business and  further because o f  the 
uncertainty associated with such phrases as “ fitness for purpose” 
and “ m erchan tab il i ty” .5
The rules related to risk may seem to produce harsh results 
upon a buyer who has been the victim o f  unscrupulous trade  prac­
1 See, for example, MOTOR VEHICLE IN FO RM ATIO N  AND  COST SA V ­
IN G S A C T  \5 U.S.C.A. 1988, 1989; UNIFORM CONSUMER SA L E S PRAC­
TICES A C T  (U.L.A.); TRADE PRACTICES A C T , S B C. 1974, c.96; Bill 55, 
4th Sess., 29th Legis., Ontario 23 Eliz. II, 1974; Bill 21, 4th Sess., 17th Legis., 
Alberta 24 Eliz. II, 1975.
2 Ontario Law Reform Commission, REPO RT ON CONSUMER W A R R A N ­
TIES AN D  G U ARAN TEES IN  THE SA LE  OF GOODS (Ontario, Department 
of Justice, 1972) p. 32.
3 See: P.S. Atiyah and F.A.R. Bennion, “ Mistake in the Construction of 
Contracts;, (1961), 24 Mod. L.Rev. 421 at 433.
4 R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-l ss. 13-16.
5 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Supra n.l at pp. 36-41.
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tices. All too often a vendor, fully aw are  o f  the defects in his goods 
offered for sale, and cognizant o f  the buyer’s ignorance o f  those 
defects, m ay  by his silence unload those goods onto  the unsuspecting 
p u rc h a s e r .  Generally , the buyer in such c ircum stances will be left 
w ithout a remedy because the law imposes no obligation on the seller 
to disclose defects. M ere  silence is not a misrepresentation  however 
deceptive it m ay  be in fact. The  m ere  offer to sell defective goods 
with the knowledge th a t  they are  defective is not f r a u d /  T here  are  a 
few m ajo r  exceptions to  this general right to  remain silent. Briefly, 
the exceptions are as follows:
(a) A duty  to disclose arises with respect to facts com ing to the 
seller’s notice before the conclusion o f  the contract if  they 
falsify an express representation  m ade p re v io u s ly .7
(b) A duty  to disclose all m ateria l facts arises when the seller 
m akes an express representation  which is incomplete and 
thus am ounts  to a half- tru th .8
(c) I f  it can be shown tha t  it is a cus tom  of the trade  to disclose 
defects, then it is a m isrepresenta tion  to fail to disclose the 
defect.9
(d) In contracts  uberrimae fid es , or  where som e fiduciary duty  
exists between the contracting  parties, disclosure is a prere­
quisi te .10
(e) I f  the decision o f  the English C o u r t  of  Appeal in Karsales 
(H arrow) Ltd. v. Wallis11 is carried  to  its natura l conclusion, 
then a seller may be liable for failing to disclose a defect 
arising between the tim e o f  exam ination o f  the goods by the 
buyer and the time the risk passes to the buyer.
( 0  Finally, recent developments in tort  law and products 
liability, particularly  the judgm ent o f  the Suprem e C o u r t  o f  
C a n ad a  in Rivtow  Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works'2 
impose an obligation on m anufac tu re rs  and retailers to warn 
o f  defects in goods which pose a potential danger  to the 
physical safety of  those using the product.  Ritchie J. said 
tha t “ . . . knowledge o f  the danger involved in the continued 
use . . .  for the purpose for which they [pintle-type cranes] 
were designed carried with it a duty to warn those to whom
6 Ward v. Hobbs (1877), 3 Q.B.D. 158, affirmed (1878), 4 A.C. 13 (H.L.).
7 With v. O' Flanagan [1936] Ch. 575; Briess v. Woolley, [1954] A.C. 333.
8 Dimmock v. Hallett (1866), 2 Ch. App. 21; Peek v. Gurney (1873) L.R. 6 H.L.
377, 392; Arkwright v. Newbold (1881), 17 Ch. D. 301, 318.
9 Jones v. Bowden (1813), 4 Taunt. 847; 128 E.R. 565.
10 Carter v. Boehm (1766), 3 Burr. 1905.
11 [1956] 2 All E.R. £66; [1956] 1 W .L.R. 936. See: Atiyah and Bennion, “ Mistake
in the Construction of C ontracts" (1961), 24 Mod. L. Rev. 421 at 430.
12 [1974] S.C.R. 1189 (S.C.C.).
U.N.B.  L A W  J O U R N A L 57
cranes had been supplied” .13 It should be noted th a t  this duty 
applies even after the delivery o f  the goods to  the  purchaser  
but appears  restricted to defects liable to  result in personal 
injury.
The right to rem ain  silent does not give rise to  the right to con­
ceal the existence of  som e defect o r  some o the r  m ateria l fact. The 
com m on law distinguishes between the vendor’s passive ac­
quiescence in the self-deception o f  the buyer and  the active conceal­
ment o f  defects in the goods being offered for sale. The la tter  
am ounts  to a fraudulent m isrepresentation, whereby the  purchaser  is 
entitled to sue for dam ages or  to rescind the contract.  Active con­
cealm ent was recognized as a f raudulent m isrepresen ta tion  as early 
as 1862 in Horsfall and Another v. Thomas'4 and  still fo rm s a pa r t  o f  
our com m on law .15 This duty  was expressed in Kerr on Fraud and 
M istake16 in the following manner:
"A  Vendor may not...use any art or practise any artifice to conceal defects, 
or make any representation for the purpose of throwing the buyer off his 
guard, or use any device to induce the buyer to omit inquiry or examination 
into the defects of the thing sold. If he says or does anything whatever with 
an intention to divert the eye or obscure the observation of the buyer even in 
relation to open defects, or to prevent his use of any present means of obser­
vation, there is misrepresentation” .
T he  seller impliedly represents tha t  the article is in fact w hat ex facie 
it purports  to be; tha t is to say, the article has been given the a p ­
pearance of  possessing better quality o r  condition than  it actually 
possesses.17 This appearance am ounts  to  a m isrepresentation .
II. ACTIVE CONCEALMENT: TYPES
A. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Practical difficulties arise, however, in a t tem pting  to distinguish 
between concealment and mere silence. The distinction is crucial to 
the success o f  any action brought by the purchaser. T he  te rm  
“ concea lm en t”  creates notions o f  some positive act and  not merely a 
sta te  o f  mind. On the other hand, non-disclosure or  silence is an 
omission, ra ther  than a positive act. It is consistent only with co m ­
plete passiveness on the vendor’s par t  vis-à-vis the defect o r  fact, 
a l though, there may be a “ guilty” s ta te  o f  mind. Only  by an ex ­
am inat ion  o f  the cases is it possible to arrive at som e satisfactory
13 Id ., at p. 1200
14 (1862), 1 H. & C. 90, 158 E.R. 813.
15 See, for example: Ames v. Investo Plan Ltd. et al (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 613
(B.C.C.A.).
16 Denis Lane McDonnell and John George Monroe, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1952) p. 49.
17 Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner, THE LA W  OF AC~ 
TIONABLE M ISREPRESENTATION  (London: Butterworths, 1974), p. 72.
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conclusion as to the natu re  o f  this all im por tan t  distinction between 
concealm ent and non-disclosure.
Essentially the types o f  concea lm ent which am oun t to a 
fraudulent m isrepresentation, entitling the purchaser  to an action in 
deceit seem to fall generally into one or m ore o f  the following 
categories:
(1) steps taken to prevent exam ination;
(2) camouflaging the defect;
(3) diversion of  the buyer’s a t tention;
(4) avoidance of  the buyer’s suspicion; or
(5) creation o f  a false m arket.
There  is however, nothing sacred abou t the preceding classifica­
tions and it is quite possible tha t  o ther  methods o f  concealm ent could 
be construed as fraudulent m isrepresentations.
B. THE TYPES
(i) Steps Taken to Prevent Examination.
The philosophy behind the m axim  caveat em ptor is tha t  the 
purchaser  is free to inspect the goods or property  offered for sale. 
He should therefore be responsible for his failure to  discover patent 
defects. Consequently , any a t tem pt by the vendor to prevent the 
purchaser’s exam ination of  the goods or  property  and to thereby 
avoid his discovery o f  the defects, am ounts  to actionable conceal­
ment.
Schneider v. H eath18 provides the best illustration of  conceal­
ment by means of  avoiding inspection. In tha t  case, the defendant 
had taken his ship, the Juno, from the w ater  to dry dock for minor 
repairs  when he discovered tha t  the ship’s keel was in an advanced 
state o f  deterioration . The Defendant prom ptly  “ took her from the 
ways on which she lay, and where the s ta te  o f  her bo ttom  and her 
keel might easily have been discovered, and kept her constantly  
afloat, so tha t  these defects were completely concealed by the 
w a te r .1” ’ The ship was advertised for sale “ with all defects”  and sold 
to the Plaintiff.  Lord Mansfield, C .J.  held that such conduct con­
stituted “ positive fraud” , entitling the plaintiff  to  a return  o f  his 
deposit. Intention to defraud the P laintiff  was implied from the 
D efendant’s conduct.
Schneider v. Heath should be contrasted  with Baglehole v. 
Walters20, where Lord  Ellenborough affirmed the sale o f  a ship “ with 
all defects” on the ground tha t  no active step had been taken  to con­
18 (1813), 3 Camp. 506, 170 E.R. 1462.
19 Id., 170 E.R. 1462 at 1463.
20 (1811), 3 Camp. 154, 170 E.R. 1338.
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ceal the defect.  Since the a l l- im portan t  requirem ent for some 
positive act, such as returning the ship to the water  to prevent ex­
am ination ,  was lacking, the defendant was guilty o f  no  fraud. Lord 
Ellenborough said: “ In a con trac t  such as this I think there is no 
fraud, unless the seller, by positive means, renders it impossible for 
the purchaser  to detect la tent faults .” 21
A nother  com m on m ethod  o f  preventing the purchaser  from 
conducting an exam ination  o f  the goods being offered for sale is by 
m eans of  a falsehood to the effect tha t the goods for some reason 
canno t be inspected. This tactic is frequently employed in the sale of 
real property . F or  example, in Leeson v. Darlow22 the defendant 
would not allow the P la in t i f fs  representative to see any par t  o f  the 
tenem ent house except the basem ent by suggesting:
“ . . . it would be unwise to make any attempt to see through the building, 
that the tenants objected to being shown through, prospective purchasers 
and such like and that it would be better not to go through” .23
T here  followed a positive assurance tha t  the premises were in excel­
lent repair; nonetheless, the a t tem p t  to prevent the purchaser  from 
discovering the dilapidated  condition o f  the house constitu ted  a 
fraudulent concealment.  M asten  J.A . o f  the O n ta r io  C ourt  o f  A p ­
peal said:
Active concealment of a fact is equivalent to a positive statement that the 
fact does not exist. By active concealment is meant any act done with intent 
to prevent a fact from being discovered...24
A similar finding was m ade in A bel v. M acDonald25 when the 
plaintiff purchased premises in such a sta te  of  repair  that they im ­
mediately collapsed. The Defendant had prevented the plaintiff 
from discovering the s ta te  o f  disrepair  by refusing to allow the plain­
tiff to examine certa in  room s o f  the house on the excuse tha t  her 
child was ill and also by drawing the blinds to  those room s to 
frustra te  any a t tem p t  m ade by the plaintiff to inspect from the o u t­
side.
(ii) Camouflaging The Defect
Another  positive act am ounting  to fraudulent concea lm ent is 
the cam ouflaging o f  defects. As stated in Kerr on Fraud And  
M istake , “ ...a vendor may not. ..use any art  or practise any artifice to 
conceal defects...for the purpose o f  throwing the buyer off  his guard , 
or use any device to induce the buyer to omit inquiry or  exam ination
21 Id., 170 E.R. 1338 at 1339.
22 (1926), 59 O.L.R. 421; (1926] 4 D.L.R. 415 (Ont. C.A.)
23 59 O.L.R. 421 at 439-440.
24 59 O.L.R. 421 at 440.
25 (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 198 (Ont. C.A.).
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into the defects of  the thing sold” .26
In Horsfall and Another v. Thomas27 the defendant ordered a 
cannon  from the plaintiff, giving two bills o f  exchange in paym ent 
therefor. The  defendant defaulted on the second bill when a defect in 
the cannon  caused it to explode. The  defendant claimed tha t  the 
p la intiff  had  inserted a metal plug in the cannon to  conceal the defect 
from any person inspecting the gun. Bramwell B. said th a t  the 
defendant would have been justified in rescinding the con trac t  if 
there was evidence o f  active concealm ent which did in fact conceal 
the defect.  However, since the court  found tha t  the defendant had 
not exam ined the cannon, it was impossible for the a t tem pted  con­
cealm ent to  have had any opera tion  on the de fendan t’s mind or  con­
duct. On this ground, judgm ent was entered for the plaintiff  vendor. 
T h a t  pa r t  o f  Bramwell B.’s judgm en t has since been questioned. The 
facts presented in the case could equally support the conclusion tha t  
the defendant did indeed exam ine the cannon. C ockburn  L.J. in 
Smith  v. Hughes28 would likely have allowed the defendant to 
repudia te  the  con trac t  on grounds o f  active concealm ent tan tam o u n t  
to  fraud. Certain ly  the p la in t i f f s  a t tem p t  in the Horsfall case met 
the test of  active concealm ent put forth by M asten  J .A. o f  the O n ­
ta rio  C o u r t  o f  Appeal in Leeson v. Darlow: “ ... to cover over the 
defects o f  an  article sold with intent tha t  they shall not be discovered 
by the buyer has the sam e effect in law as a s ta tem ent in words tha t  
those defects do not exist” .29
Defects may also be cam ouflaged  by the m ethod  o f  packing. It 
is not uncom m on, for example, to purchase a bushel of  what appears 
to be fresh, ripe apples, only to discover upon removing the top  layer 
tha t  the bulk is neither ripe nor fresh. While this may at tim es fall 
under the sale by sample rules o f  the N ew  Brunswick Sale o f  Goods 
Act*0, such practices would also seem to constitute  active conceal­
ment. In Udell v. Atherton3I, M artin  B. suggested tha t  it was 
fraudulent to  conceal a hole in a log of  m ahogany  being offered for 
sale by turning the log over. In Jones v. Bowden'2 it was held th a t  a 
m isrepresenta tion  had been m ade  in the sale o f  sea-dam aged  
pimento , when the samples from the bulk showed no such defect in 
the pimento.
26 Supra., n. 16 at p. 49.
27 (1862), 1 H. & C. 90, 158 E.R. 813.
28 (1871), L.R. 6 Q.B. 597, See: J.P. Benjamin, BENJAM IN ON SA LE S  (New 
York: Hurd and Houghton, 1877) p. 441-442.
29 Supra., n. 22 at 59 O.L.R. 440.
30 R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S -l, ss. 14, 16.
31 (1861), 7 H. & N. 172; 158 E.R. 437.
32 (1813), 4 Taunt. 847; 128 E.R. 565. See: Bower and Turner, THE LA W OF AC­
TIONABLE M ISREPRESENTATIO N, supra, n. 17, p. 72.
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Hill v. Gray33 is a curious case. In th a t  case, the defendant 
purchased a p ic ture under the  m is taken belief tha t  it belonged to  Sir 
Felix A gar.  The  p la in tif f s  agent knew tha t  the defendant laboured 
under this delusion, but said nothing. This would seem to be the 
classic case where m ere silence or reticence on the part o f  the vendor 
would not afford the defendant purchaser  an opportun ity  to rescind 
the con trac t  or to seek dam ages .  Yet Lord E llenborough said:
“ Although it was the finest picture that Claude [the actual artist] ever 
painted, it must not be sold under a deception. The agent ought to have 
cautiously adhered to his original stipulation, that he should not com­
municate the name of the proprietor, and not to have let in the suspicion on 
the part of the purchaser which he knew enhanced the price. He saw that 
the defendant had fallen into a delusion in supposing the picture to be Sir 
Felix Agar’s, and yet he did not remove it...This case has arrived at its ter­
mination, since it appears that the purchaser laboured under a deception, in 
which the agent permitted him to remain, on a point which he thought 
material to influence his judgment.”34
This case is not easily reconciled with both earlier and later 
authorities.  It is difficult to find any positive act o f  concealm ent 
from the facts as stated in the case. Yet in Keates v. Earl Cadogan, 
this was described as a case o f  positive “ aggressive deceit” .35 Hill v. 
Gray has not, however, developed as a landm ark  case in the law of 
concealment. Later  authori ties would still seem to  require some 
m ore  positive act on the par t  o f  the seller before holding him liable 
for fraudulen t misrepresentation . Indeed, in Keates v. Cadogan 
itself, Jervis C .J.  did not find any active concealm ent by the Vendor 
in failing to disclose to the vendee the ruinous and unsafe condition 
o f  the house being sold, even though the vendee was clearly labouring 
under a deceptive belief as to the condition o f  the property. Ben­
jam in On Sales suggests tha t  it was the act o f  the agent in putting  the 
picture am ong  those belonging to Sir  Felix A gar  which constituted 
the concea lm en t.36 Such an explanation  is consistent with the view 
tha t  cam ouflaging a fact, or  defect, am ounts  to active concealment; 
however, if such be the case, it is only the very slightest o f  acts upon 
which the C our t  will seize in order  to  find active concealment as op­
posed to m ere silence.
O ther  frequent a t tem pts  a t cam ouflaging defects, or facts, may 
be found in the “ antiquing furn itu re”  cases in which the furniture 
m ade  to appear  an tique becomes “ a silent asserte r” .37 In such cases,
33 (1816), 1 Stark. 434; 171 E.R. 521.
34 Id., 171 E.R. 521.
35 (1851), 10 C.B. 591; 138 E.R. 234 at 238 (per Jervis C.J.)
36 Supra., n. 28, pp. 442-443.
37 Patterson v. Landsberg and Son ( >05), 7 F. (Ct. of Sess.) 675 at 681; Edgar v. 
Hector, [1912] S.C. 348; See: '«wer and Turner, THE LA W  OF AC­
TIONABLE M ISREPRESEN TATIO N  supra, n. 17, p. 78.
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the person deceived has the norm al remedies available for ac tionable 
concealm ent.
(iii) Diverting The Buyer’s A ttention
A ny a t tem p t  by the vendor to conceal the discovery o f  defects, 
or  o ther  m ateria l facts by diverting his a t tention  away from the 
defect constitutes an active concealment or  m isrepresen ta tion .58 A 
m odern  application of  this practice might be the use o f  subdued 
lighting or  o f  large m irrors  designed to obscure vision or  inhibit close 
inspection o f  the goods being offered for sale. This would seem to 
meet the requirem ents  laid down in Horsfall v. Thomas and o ther  
authori ties  tha t  there be (1) deliberate acts (2) intended to prevent 
the buyer’s discovery o f  certain facts or defects (3) affecting the value 
or quality  o f  the goods being sold and (4) which do in fact conceal 
those defects from the buyer, thereby inducing him to en ter  into a 
contract.
(iv) Avoiding The Buyer's Suspicion
Often the seller will want to avoid raising the potential 
pu rchase r ’s suspicions by concealing his own identity as the vendor. 
In Leeson v. D ar /ow 39 the defendant Nealy who was the sole 
beneficial owner o f  the property  offered for sale put title to the 
property  in the nam e o f  the defendant Darlow in order  to better 
enable sale o f  the property. This was a fraudulent concea lm ent o f  a 
m ateria l fact designed to induce the purchaser  to en ter  into a t r a n ­
saction which he would have otherwise avoided or  which would have 
at least affected the price. It gives rise to an action for deceit.
In Hepting  v. S ch aaf0 the S uprem e C our t  o f  C a n a d a  affirmed 
the unreported  judgm en t of  the trial judge who aw arded  dam ages  to 
the p la intiff  for the de fendan t’s fraudulent m isrepresentation  
implied, inter alia, from the concealm ent o f  the fact no building per­
mit to build a suite on the premises had been issued, thereby reducing 
the value of  the property . The report does not disclose what active 
steps, if any, were taken to conceal tha t  there was no building per­
mit. It is, however, ano ther  exam ple  o f  how active concealm ent may 
be used to avoid raising the vendee’s suspicions and further tha t  such 
a concea lm ent is a fraudulent misrepresentation .
(v) False M arket
A nother  m ethod  of  concealm ent which constitutes a fraudulent 
m isrepresen ta tion  is the device known as “ rigging the m a rk e t ’’ or 
alternatively, “ m aking  a m a rk e t ’’.41 It is used prim arily  to m isrepre­
38 See: K ERR ON FRAUDS  supra., n. 16, p. 49.
39 Supra., n. 22.
40 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 168 (S.C.C.).
41 See: Bower and Turner, supra, n. 17, pp. 220-222.
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sent by implication the value o f  the property  offered for sale by m a k ­
ing the dem an d  for it appear  much grea ter  than  it is in fact. It can, 
however, be used to conceal facts o ther  than  the fair m arke t value or 
dem and. This m ethod o f  concealm ent has probably  had its greatest 
use in share transactions. In Scoff v. Brown, Doering, M cNab and 
Co.42 it was held that an agreem ent between two or m ore persons to 
purchase shares in a com pany to induce o thers  to believe tha t  there 
was a far g rea ter  value to the shares than  actually existed was a fraud 
on the persons so deceived.
III. THE POSITIVE ACT PREREQUISITE
W hether  the concealm ent is brought about by (i) preventing an 
exam ina tion  by the purchaser, (ii) cam ouflaging the defect or 
m ateria l fact, (iii) diverting the buyer’s at tention , (iv) avoiding his 
suspicions or  (v) creating a false m arke t ,  the com m on thread  running 
th roughou t the cases on actionable concealm ent is the requirem ent 
for som e positive, aggressive act of  concea lm ent on the part o f  the 
vendor. The only real chink in the a rm o u r  was Hill v. G ray , 
al though that too is reconcilable.45 The  im portan t  and decisive ele­
ment is tha t  of  the positive act because the o ther  required elements o f  
fraudulent intent, deception and materia lity  may all be implied by 
virtue o f  the ac t.  To say, as did Jervis C .J.  in Keates v. Cadogan44 
tha t  the act must be “ aggressive”  is misleading. Anything tha t  goes 
beyond mere silence or mere omission will suffice to constitute an 
“ active”  concealment.
Alternatively, the d isappointed buyer might argue that the mis­
take  or deception was such tha t  there was no consensus ad idem  as to 
the identity o f  the subject m a tte r  or o ther  materia l term . P roo f  of  
the vendor’s active concealm ent is not essential to  such an a rgu ­
m en t4'. If there is no consensus ad idem, there is no contract.  Lord 
A tkin  however, said that a m is take as to quality will not affect assent 
unless (1) it is the m istake o f  both  parties and (2) “ is as to the ex­
istence of  some quality which m akes the thing without the quality es­
sentially different from the thing as it was believed to be.” 4h
The fine line between active concealm ent and mere non­
disclosure is best exemplified in Schneider v. Heath , the facts of
42 [18921 2 Q.B. 724 (C.A.). See also: N ATIO N AL EXCHANGE CO OF 
Glasgow v. Drew (1855), 2 Macq. H.L. 103 and R. v. Deherenger (1814), 3 M. & 
S. 67; 105 E.R. 536.
43 See supra, at pp. 12, 13.
44 Supra., n. 35 at 138 E.R. 238.
45 Cundy v. Lindsay 3 A.C. 459; Smith v. Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 605; London 
Holeproof Hosiery Co. Ltd. v. Padmore (1928), 44 T.L.R. 499 (Eng. C.A.); 
Scriven Bros. A Co. v. Hindley & Co. [1913] 3 K.B. 564.
46 Bell v. Lever Brothers. Ltd., [1932J A.C. 161, 218 (H.L.).
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which were discussed supra, and Ward v. Hobbs*1. In Ward v. 
Hobbs the defendant sold pigs “ with all faults” in a m a rk e t  knowing 
th a t  they were infected with typhoid. The Plaintiff purchased the 
pigs and, upon discovering the typhoid, sued the plaintiff  claiming 
com pensa tion .  The H ouse o f  Lords said there was no du ty  on the 
defendant to disclose the existence of  the typhoid even though the 
health  inspector at the m a rk e t  had declared the pigs to be sound. By 
putting  the pigs up for sale at the m arke t ,  knowing all the while o f  
the contag ious disease and of  the health inspector’s e rror,  the defen­
d an t  had still com m itted  no positive act o f  deceit.  Consequently  the 
pla in tiff  was without remedy. However, in the ana lagous Schneider 
case there  was an additional factor: the defendant took  the boat 
from  the dry dock after realizing the condition o f  its hull and put it in 
the w ater  to avoid inspection by prospective purchasers.  It was on 
this fact tha t the case hinged. I f  the boat had been in the water all 
a long and if the vendor had som e other means whereby he knew of 
the condition o f  the b o a t ’s bo ttom , the purchaser  would have been 
left w ithout a remedy.
It is interesting to note th a t  in light o f  R v to w  Marine** both 
Ward v. Hobbs and Schneider v. Heath m ight be decided in favour 
o f  the  purchaser today on the ground tha t  the concealed defects 
th rea tened  the physical safety o f  the purchasers. The Plaintiff  
would, however, be restricted to dam ages a t tr ibu tab le  to  breach o f  
the duty  to warn which m ay, in an appropr ia te  case, include 
econom ic  loss. O f  course this argum ent is o f  no avail where the 
goods sold present no threa t o f  physical harm  and  the defect or fact 
concealed  affects only the value or quality o f  those goods. Therefore 
R ivtow  Marine would not be arguable in Am es v. Investo-Plan et al49 
where, in selling treasury shares in the Perfo rm ance  Plus Fund Ltd., 
it was not disclosed tha t  the prospectus o f  the com pany had never 
been approved by the Securities Com m ission  o f  British Colum bia . 
S ince the re  was neither s ta tu tory  relief available to  the plaintiff nor 
any active concealm ent by the defendant,  the British C olum bia  
C o u r t  o f  Appeal affirmed the validity o f  the transaction .
O ne interesting depa r tu re  from the norm al positive act require­
m ent is in the area o f  fraudulent concea lm ent o f  a cause o f  action. In 
A pplegate  v. M oss50 and King v. Victor Parsons & C o .51 the English 
C o u r t  o f  Appeal has espoused a doctrine o f  “ equitable f raud” . If the 
defendant is aw are th a t  the p la intiff  has a cause o f  action against him
47 (1878), 4 A.C. 13 (H.L.).
48 (1974) S.C.R. 1189 (S.C.C.).
49 (1973) 35 D.L.R. (3d) 613 (B.C.C.A.).
50 [1971] I Q B 406 (Eng. C.A.)
51 [1973] I W.L.R. 28 (Eng. C.A.).
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for breach o f  con trac t  and he does not disclose tha t  fact to the pla in­
tiff, the defendant is guilty o f  a fraudulen t concealm ent whereby the 
English Limitations A ct s tipulates th a t  the six year l im itation period 
will not begin to run against the plaintiff  until he discovers the 
breach of  contract.  While these cases form an interesting con tras t  to 
the co m m on  law concea lm ent rules, their application is limited to 
disclosure o f  breaches of  te rm s o f  existing contracts .  The non­
disclosure does not give rise to any rights and liabilities; ra the r  it ex­
tends a lready  existing rights and liabilities. They have no par t  in the 
negotiat ion o f  contracts .
IV. REMEDIES
A . D A M A G E S
D am ages are available to the victim o f  a seller’s fraudulent con ­
cealment. Dam ages are recoverable for:
(i) pecuniary loss;
(ii) personal injury;
(iii) property  d am age  or loss.
A claim for dam ages for active concealm ent is founded in the to r t  o f  
deceit.  D am ages for pecuniary loss therefore do not reward the ex­
pecta tion interest.  The philosophy behind dam age  awards in tort 
c laim is to put the plaintiff  in the position he would be in had the 
fraudulent m isrepresentation by m eans o f  concealm ent not been 
m a d e .52 The m easure of  dam ages  is the difference between the 
purchase price actually paid by the Plaintiff  and the value of  the 
property  at the time o f  the sale.
The failure to com pensa te  the purchase r’s expectation interest 
can be o f  considerable significance. Parna et al v. G A S . Proper ties 
Ltd. et a li} is an exam ple of  such an instance. In the Parna case, the 
plaintiffs paid $251,000 for property , the net annual income on 
which the defendant vendor fraudulently  represented to be $24,193, 
or an annual yield o f  9.6% on the actual purchase price. In fact, the 
net annual income of the property  was only $21,807. The trial judge, 
in assessing the dam ages,  determ ined the am oun t  o f  capital which at 
9.6% would yield a net annual income o f  $21,807. He found it to be 
$226,210. He then gave the plaintiffs judgm ent for the difference 
between $251,000 (the am oun t  paid) and $226,210; in o ther  words, 
$24,790. O n appeal,  the judgm en t was varied and the plaintiff 
aw arded only the reduced sum o f  $4,000. Evans J .A . said that the
52 John G. Fleming, THE LA W OF TORTS  (Australia: The Law Book Co., 1971 ) 
pp. 560-561. See also: Parna et al. v. G. & S. Properties Ltd. et at (1969), 5 
D.L.R. (3d) 315, at 317 (Ont. C.A.; Hepting et al v. SchaaJ, [ 1964J S.C.R. 100 
(S.C.C.).
53 (1969). 5 D.L.R. (3d) 315 (Ont. C.A.) (per Evans J.A.).
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trial judge  had erred by measuring dam ages  as the difference 
between the price actually  paid and what would have been the value 
if the representations had been true. In an action for deceit,  the 
plaintiffs are  not entitled to the loss o f  their  bargain, unless they can 
establish a breach o f  warranty.
The following hypothetical provides another  illustration o f  the 
refusal o f  the C ourts  to com pensa te  the purchaser’s expectation in­
terest in deceit actions arising out o f  an active concealment: S u p ­
pose A buys from B a valuable china vase, paying $1,000 therefor. 
However, the vase has a serious crack which B conceals by the use of 
glue. Because o f  the crack, the actual value of  the vase is only $700. 
W hen he bought the vase, A had a prospective purchaser, C, who 
was willing to pay $1400 for it. C, however, discovers the c rack and 
will not take  the vase. A sues B in deceit for actively concealing the 
defect:
If Expectation Interest If  Restitution Interest
C om pensa ted : C om pensa ted :
Value o f  Vase without Purchase Price ($1000)
C rack  ($1400) Less: value of  vase ($ 700)
Less:Actual value of  
Vase with crack ($ 700)
Equal: A ’s dam ages  ($ 700) Equals: A ’s dam ages  ($ 300)
In an action for deceit,  A will recover only $300. T o  be entitled 
to $700, A will have to establish a breach o f  w arran ty  or  condition. 
T herefore  when acting on behalf  o f  a purchaser,  a solicitor should 
always be conscious o f  the difference between the value o f  the expec­
ta tion  and resti tu tion  interests, and, where significant, a t tem p t to es­
tablish an implied te rm  under the Sale o f  Goods A ct, or an express 
condition or w arran ty  related to the quality of  the goods.
Besides dam ages for pecuniary loss, relief may be granted  for 
any personal injury suffered as a result o f  the defect fraudulently 
concealed by the Vendor. The  O n ta r io  C o u r t  o f  Appeal in Graham  
v. Saville-4 concurred  in Lord W ensleydale’s opinion expressed in 
Sm ith  v. K ay55 tha t  the “ only dam ages  o f  which the law takes 
cognizance [...in a deceit action...]  is ac tua l and tem poral  dam age-  
tha t  is, some loss either of  money or m oney’s worth, or some 
physical injury, capable o f  being pecuniarily com pensa ted . . .“ . 
D am ages are therefore recoverable for physical injury, including 
pain and suffering.
54 [1945] 2 D.L.R. 489 (Ont. C.A.) per Roach J.A ., See also: Harry Street. 77ie Law 
o f Torts (London: Butterworths, 1972), 5th ed., p. 375.
55 (1858), 7 H.L.C. 750 at 775, 1 1 E.R. 309.
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Resultan t property  dam age  is also recoverable in an action for 
deceit.  In M ullett v. M ason56 the defendant seller fraudulently mis­
represented tha t  a cow was free from disease. The disease spread 
from the infected cow, killing five o ther  cows. The Plaintiff sued 
successfully for the loss of  the five o ther  infected cows.
Exem plary  dam ages  are not normally allowed in a deceit ac­
t io n . '7
B. R E SC ISSIO N
It is a m axim  tha t  fraud vitiates everything. Accordingly, the 
defrauded purchaser  is generally entitled not only to his dam ages,  
but also to rescind a con trac t  induced by fraud. The contract re­
mains valid until rescinded, unless the mistake was so fundamental 
tha t  there was no consensus ad idem. In the latter, and exceedingly 
rare, instance the con trac t  is void.58 Norm ally ,  therefore, the 
purchaser  must elect to  affirm or avoid the contract.  An election is 
irrevocable. Furthe rm ore ,  aff irm ation may be inferred by conduct 
upon discovery of the f raud .5’ Such was the result in Leeson v. 
Darlowb0 where the plaintiff  by her dealings with the property after 
learning o f  the defendan t’s fraudulent concealment, and by her 
delay, was held to have affirmed the contract.  She was therefore 
restricted to a claim for dam ages. Once the contract is affirmed, the 
right to avoid it is extinguished.
The right to rescind is also dependent upon the possibility of  
restitutio in integrum. A t com m on law, there could be no rescission 
unless there could be com plete  restoration  in specie o f  the status quo 
ante. N o  allowance would be made for such exigencies as deprecia­
tion. The courts  o f  equity relaxed these stringent com m on law rules. 
As a result , deprecia tion and other exigencies are the subject of  con­
sequential orders and, in the interest o f  justice, restitutio in integrum 
is required only so far as it is practically possible.M If the Plaintiff 
cannot return the property  to the defendant in the same state, the 
defendant will at least receive money value as compensation . 
Equitable relief is o f  course discretionary.
56 (1866), L.R. I C.P. 559.
57 John G. Fleming, The Law o f Torts (Australia: The Law Book Company, 1971) 
pp. 560-561.
58 Cundy v. Lindsay (1878), 3 A.C. 459.
59 United Shoe Co. v. Brunei [1909] A.C. 330.
60 (1926), 59 O .L.R. 421; [1926] 4 D.L.R. 415 (Ont. C.A.).
61 Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878), 3 A.C. 1218 (H.L.); See 
generally, Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law o f  Contract (London: Butterworths, 
1969), 7th ed.. pp. 249-252.
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PART TWO:
REFORM OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONCEALMENT:
A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
V. DISCLOSURE OF KNOWN MATERIAL DEFECTS
The curious and rather  a rb it ra ry  distinction between mere 
silence and  active concealment begs the simple question: “ W hy?” . 
The vendor scarcely seems less morally b lameworthy because he ac­
quiesces in the buyer’s m istaken belief. In either instance, he is t a k ­
ing an unfair  advantage of  an unsuspecting buyer. One may also 
question why the courts  have moved only so far as to impose a duty 
to disclose those defects which endanger the user’s safety. Should 
this trend not be extended to include all defects, even those affecting 
quality. Finally, it remains to be considered why quality-related 
defects are  not at least tan tam oun t  to a breach of such o f  the implied 
conditions as fitness for purpose.62
T h e  m ax im  caveat em ptor  developed  because  o f  the 
acknowledged need for certainty to govern the day to  day affairs and 
dealings o f  businessmen. It is essential to both parties in the 
bargaining process tha t identifiable rights and duties be created. 
Any other  system would be intolerable and unm anageable . The 
courts  are reluctant therefore to interfere in either the bargaining 
process or  the final contract.  Parties should be free to con trac t  their 
own term s. Atkin L.J. expressed this sentiment in Bell v. Lever 
Brothers Limited:"'
...Nothing is more dangerous than to allow oneself liberty to construct for 
the parties contracts which they have not in terms made by importing 
implications which would appear to make the contract more businesslike or 
more just...
and later:
...Nevertheless it is of greater importance that well established principles of 
contract should be maintained than that a particular hardship should be 
redressed...
Bramwell B. said it would be “ mischievous”  if the seller were:
...bound to point out everything which might by any possibility be con­
sidered a defect; and the consequence would be that if the manufacturer, for 
prudence sake, pointed out some flaw which made no difference whatever in 
the value of the article, the purchaser would immediately say, 'There is a 
defect, I must have an abatement of the price'....64
Such opinions are not without considerable merit.  It would be in­
conceivable that a seller should be obliged to point out every single 
defect o r  flaw. Such a standard  would be thoroughly subjective and
62 SA LE  OF GOODS A C T  R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S -l, S. 15(a).
63 [1932] A.C. 161 at 226 and 229 (H.L.).
64 Hors/all et al v. Thomas (1862), 1 H. & C. 90, 158 E.R. 813 at 817.
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grossly unfair. N o  vendor should be left so unprotected  tha t  he is not 
able to oblige a purchaser to accept responsibility for faults which to 
a reasonable m an  with average intelligence would have been readily 
apparen t upon inspection, so long as nothing was done to hinder that 
inspection of  the property. It is submitted , however, tha t where 
there are  (1) m ajo r  defects affecting quality; (2) o f  which the vendor 
is aware (3) a t  the tim e the con trac t  is made, other principles ought 
to be considered. In all the cases where active concealment was held 
to be fraudulent,  these three factors were present. In all instances 
the defects were such that,  had the purchaser  been aw are  of  the ex­
isting defects, he would not have entered into the contract  o r  a l te r­
natively, would have done so at a greatly reduced price. If any of  
these three requisites (materiality , knowledge, and pre-existence) 
were lacking, the purchaser would not have successfully proven con­
cealment.
However, in creating the rules related to active concealment,  the 
courts  have perhaps mistakenly over-emphasized the infringement o f  
the right to  inspect. As a result, we have arrived at this a rb itra ry  dis­
tinction between active concealm ent and mere non-disclosure. The 
elements o f  unconscionability, so im portan t to the result , have been 
overlooked in providing reasons for that result . Recognition should 
be given to a concept whereby knowledge affects the passing of  the 
risk to the buyer. If  a choice has to be m ade between an  im m oral 
and unscrupulous vendor and a reckless, and perhaps naive, 
purchaser, surely the risk should fall to the individual guilty o f  sharp  
and unconscionable conduct whenever the defect is o f  m ore than 
minimal significance.
O f  course, the m ore significant the defect must be before there 
is a duty to disclose its existence, the grea ter  the chance tha t  a court 
would be able to fit it into one of  the implied term s of  the Sale o f  
Goods A ct. However, it is undesirable tha t  a purchaser should be 
obliged to prove an implied term in all such cases. If the Sale o f  
Goods A ct is relied upon, a vendor with a superior bargaining posi­
tion who has intentionally taken advantage o f  the weaker party may 
be able to con trac t  out o f  an implied te rm  by a properly worded ex­
clusionary clause. F urtherm ore ,  the implied term s of  the Sale o f  
Goods A ct apply only to dealers. It does not m ake sense tha t  a duty 
of  disclosure or a doctrine o f  unconscionability should be limited to a 
vendor acting in the course of  his business. It should apply equally to 
private sales.
This p roposed duty of  disclosure is not as broad as the duty to 
warn imposed by Rivtow Marine. There the duty is to warn of 
defects which endanger the user’s personal safety. The duty con ­
tinues even after  risk has passed to the buyer. The reason for such a 
duty is the overriding public interest in its own personal security. In
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the norm al contract situation, there is no reason to  continue the duty 
of  disclosure once property, and therefore risk, have passed to the 
buyer. The  Rivtow  Marine case seeks to protect an entirely different 
interest. The vendor’s knowledge at the time of  bargaining is irrele­
vant in Rivtow. The reason for imposing a duty to disclose known 
m ateria l defects in everyday con trac ts  is to introduce a degree of  
conscionability and fairness into the bargaining process, not to 
protect one’s personal safety. The bargaining is over when the con­
trac t  is made. N o t only would a policy that required disclosure after 
risk had passed be unreasonably harsh, it would be impossible to ad ­
minister. If the buyer wishes such protection, he should procure 
specific assurances from his seller.
If  a duty to disclose known m ajo r  defects is to be imposed, a test 
must then be found for m easuring the significance o f  defects. Its 
s tandard  must be objective. One possible test is whether o r  not the 
defect is such that it renders the good unfit for the purpose for which 
it was intended to be put. Such a test would catch the dry rot on the 
ship’s keel in Schneider v. Heath , the typhoid infected pigs in Ward 
v. H obbs, the d ilapidated tenement house in Leeson v. Darlow  and 
A bel v. MacDonald, the faulty cannon  in Horsfall v. Thomas, the 
hole in the m ahogany  log in Udell v. A therton , the sea-dam aged  
pim ento  in Jones v. Bowden , the “ an t iqued” furniture in Patterson v. 
Landsberg and Son, and the phony painting in Hill v. Gray. An 
obligation to  disclose such defects would impose no grea ter  hardship  
on the vendor who is aw are  o f  the defect than  is already imposed by 
the com m on law rule not to conceal such defects. The vendor is no 
less morally  blam ew orthy by virtue of  his silence.
It might be felt tha t a fitness for purpose test is too strict.  
Perhaps the court should be given flexibility to impose disclosure re­
quirem ents  where the fact not disclosed is m ajo r  although not so 
significant as to affect its fitness for purpose. If such is the case, the 
test might be whether a reasonable purchaser,  aw are o f  the defects, 
would have entered into the transaction  at all, or whether he would 
have done so only at a greatly reduced price. The draw back to such 
a test is its imprecision and uncertainty. How much lower would the 
fair value o f  the goods have to be before a court could say with any 
certain ty  that the buyer would have entered into the transaction  only 
at a much lower price. A fitness for purpose test clearly affects only 
m ajo r  defects and, if liberally construed, should catch most cases of  
injustice. On the other hand, the second test covers a much broader 
range of  transactions than does fitness for purpose. For example, 
the fitness for purpose test does not catch the b la tant abuse m ade of 
suggestive selling techniques by m any fast food franchisers who 
know tha t the consum er is confused or misled as to  what foods are 
included in each item of  their menu. The consum er still gets food 
capable o f  consum ption, but if he had been aw are of  what he would
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receive, he might not have ordered as he did. This is the great advan­
tage o f  the test which objectively determines whether or not the fully 
inform ed buyer would have entered into the transaction ,  and if  so, 
only at a greatly  reduced price.
The remedy available to the purchaser should also be con­
sidered at this juncture. If a duty to disclose is imposed and breached, 
what should the buyer’s remedy be at com m on law? Clearly he 
should be allowed to rescind the contract,  because in the vast m a ­
jority  o f  cases he would never have entered into it had he been m ade 
fully aw are  o f  the facts. As for dam ages,  the question may fairly be 
asked whether the buyer should be limited to the restitution interest.  
Is the action not sufficiently proxim ate  to one in contract as to enti­
tle the aggrieved purchaser to com pensa tion  for loss o f  his expecta­
tion interest? It seems a bit unjust tha t  the remedy should depend 
upon the m anner  in which the action is framed. If the purchaser 
could somehow establish an implied or express te rm  that the goods 
are free from quality related defects, then he is entitled to sue on the 
con trac t  and claim dam ages  to his expectation interest.  F u rthe r­
more, the vendor’s m oral turp itude should be a factor in com pen­
sating the purchaser to the full extent o f  his loss. The possibility of  a 
large d am age  award may serve as a deterrent to unconscionable sell­
ing practices.
The right o f  the vendee to rescind the con trac t  and to claim 
dam ages  for the vendor’s concealm ent or non-disclosure o f  known 
m ateria l facts might fairly be tem pered by allowing the vendor the 
right to take  back the goods, re-tendering the sam e or similar goods 
within a reasonable time. The re-tendered goods would have to be of 
the quality anticipated by the purchaser  a t the time he entered into 
the contract.  Such a right would cause no injustice to the buyer 
because he would still receive what he had originally bargained for 
under the contract.
VI. OTHER SOLUTIONS
A. IN T R O D U C T IO N
There are other possible argum ents  which may be advanced on 
behalf  o f  a purchaser who falls prey to the sharp  tactics o f  a seller:
(1) some scholars suggest tha t  courts resolve analogous problems by 
what is known as the co n duc t ion  approach. (2) O f  course, the 
implied term s o f  the Sale o f  Goods Act are always a possible solu­
tion. (3) The Am erican courts  have adopted a th ird  approach ,  
known as the doctrine o f  fraud.
B. THE C O N ST R U C T IO N  A PP R O A C H
M any injustices in contracts  are avoided by treating  the 
problem s as one of  offer and acceptance. P.S. Atiyah is an advocate
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of  the construction app roach65. If a m is take is so fundam ental ,  a 
warran ty  will be implied. A vendor who accepts a purchaser’s offer, 
knowing of  the la t te r ’s m istaken belief, may be bound to  trea t  the of­
fer as though the goods were o f  the condition or  quality believed by 
the purchaser.
A. Roberts & Co. v. Leicestershire County Council is an 
analogous case in point.66 In tha t  case, the plaintiff tendered for the 
construction  o f  a new building to be com pleted in eighteen months. 
The Defendant accepted the p la in tif f  s tender, but in the formal con­
trac t  changed the term to thirty m onths. The Plaintiff  executed the 
con trac t  without noticing the change. The defendant knew of the 
p la in t i f f  s mistaken believe and the court allowed rectification o f  the 
formal contract to conform  to the p la in t i f f  s understanding of  the 
original terms. Professor Atiyah quite properly cites the Roberts 
decision as lending support to his view tha t “ ...a person who accepts 
an offer knowing the real intentions o f  the offeror is bound to trea t 
tha t  offer as though it correctly stated the o fferor’s intentions, 
whatever the objective construction o f  the offer might be” .67 It o f  
course remains to be seen if the courts  will extend the Roberts deci­
sion into the area  of  quality-related defects known to  the vendor.
The construction  approach has the advantage of  adding a 
degree o f  flexibility to the law. It would, however, be preferable if 
there were a consistent and logical development o f  the law related to 
concea lm ent into the area  o f  failure to disclose when the buyer is ob ­
viously labouring under a deceptive belief as to the goods.68 The test 
o f  course, should be an objective one such tha t  the buyer’s mistaken 
belief would be shared by a reasonable man and would further be a p ­
paren t to a reasonable vendor. O ther  shortcom ings o f  the construc­
tion approach  is its uncertainty and artificiality. The prospects o f  
persuading the court that the quality-re la ted defect is sufficiently 
fundam ental or m ateria l as to constitute  a te rm  o f  the contract 
would in a m ajority  o f  instances be ra the r  slim. If the court finds 
tha t  the m is take was one as to quality alone and tha t  it was not a 
term o f  the contract,  the maxim  caveat em ptor will leave the buyer 
without a remedy. The advisability o f  leaving this problem to such 
judicial creativity is questionable at best.
65 P S . Atiyah, JUDICIAL TECHNIQUES AND  THE ENGLISH LA W  OF 
C O N TRAC T  (1968), 2 Ottawa L. Rev. 337, at 344-350.
66 [1961] Ch. 555.
67 Supra., n. 65 at p. 348.
68 This is the approach used by many common law American jurisdictions under the 
doctrine of fraud. See infra, at p. 38.
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C. IM PLIED  TERM S
(i) Goods To Correspond With Description.
Som e relief for the purchaser  m ay be found in the implied term s 
o f  the Sale o f  Goods A c t ,69 especially m erchantabili ty  (section 15
(b)) and fitness for purpose (section 15 (a)). Section 14, which 
implies a condition that the goods sold by description shall corres­
pond with the description, is o f  little com fort  where the defect is 
related only to quality. It is unlikely that the quality related defect 
will be so great as to affect the identity o f  the goods offered for sale. 
However, once it has been shown tha t  the goods do not correspond 
with the description, the implied condition o f  conform ity  is thereby 
breached regardless of  how insignificant the variation. The initial, 
and usually fatal,  hurdle is to show that the article purchased is not 
in fact the article described.70 The requirem ent that there be a sale 
by description is easily met despite tha t  the buyer saw and examined 
the goods before m aking the contract if the deviation from descrip­
tion is not appa ren t .71 Even an over-the-counter t ransaction  has been 
trea ted  as a sale by descrip tion72. Generally, it is true to say tha t  the 
only case of  a sale not being by description occurs where the buyer 
m akes it clear tha t  he is buying a particular  thing because o f  its uni­
que qualities and that no other will do.
(ii) Merchantability.
The consum er’s greatest friend is probably found in the 
m erchantabili ty  rule of  section 15 (b). It sta tes goods must be o f  
m erchantab le  quality if:
(1) they are bought by description,
(2) from a seller who deals in goods of  that description.
The second requirem ent thereby rules out all private t ransac­
tions. Various definitions have been a t tached  to “ m erchantab le  
qual ity ’’. Farwell L.J. described m erchantabili ty  in the following 
terms:
...if article of such a quality that a reasonable man acting reasonably would 
after a full examination accept it under the circumstances of the case in per­
formance of his offer to buy that article whether he buys for his own use or 
sell again...73
69 R.S.N.B. 1973 c. S -l.
70 Arcos Ltd. v. E.A. Ronaasen and Son. [1933] A.C. 470, [ 1933J All E.R. 646 
(H.L.).
71 Beale v. Taylor [1967] I W .L.R. 1193.
72 Godley v. Perry, [1960] I W.L.R. 9. However, see Godsoe v. Beatty (1958), 19
D.L.R. (2d) 265 (N.B.C.A.) which leaves the situation in New Brunswick very un­
settled; and Peters v. Parkway Mercury Sales Limited (1975), 10 N .B .R. (2d) 703.
73 Bristol Tramways Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors Ltd. [1910] 2 K B . 831 at 841.
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Lord W right in Grant v. Australian Knitting M ills74 said m erchan ­
tability am ounted  to fitness for the general purpose for which the 
goods are  used. This la t te r  definition would exclude minor defects 
which do not affect the useability of  the good. The H ouse o f  Lords 
in Henry Kendall and Sons v. William Lillico and Sons L td .1' said 
goods are of  m erchan tab le  quality if the buyer
...fully acquainted with the facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden 
defects exist and not being limited to their apparent condition would buy 
them without abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in 
reasonably sound order and condition and without special terms....
While it is not within the  scope of  this paper to em bark  on a detailed 
exam ination of  m erchantabili ty ,  it is clear from the above definitions 
tha t  merchantabili ty  is not a settled concept. All defects are  not 
caught by it. It is a doctrine  which relates more to  useability and, 
consequently, many defects will not render  the goods unm erchan ­
table.76 As in the case o f  Smith  v. Hughes much will depend upon the 
description by which the goods were purchased.
(iii) Fitness For Purpose
The fitness for purpose doctrine m ay also be used to the advan­
tage of  a buyer who, to  the seller’s knowlegde, has purchased goods 
under some mistaken belief as to their quality or o ther  m ateria l fact. 
Section 15(a) o f  the Sale o f  Goods A ct states tha t  where the buyer, 
expressly or by im plication, m akes known to the seller the particular  
purpose for which the goods are required so as to show his reliance 
on the seller’s skill or judgm ent,  there is an implied condition that 
the goods shall be fit for such purpose. As with the merchantabili ty  
rule, the vendor must be a dealer in goods o f  tha t  description. 
Reliance is not difficult to prove because where goods are normally 
used for one purpose, the seller will be taken  to know the purpose in 
the absence of  a con tra ry  indication by the buyer.77 F urtherm ore ,  
substantial, not sole, reliance is all tha t  is required .78 Section 15(a) 
does not apply where the sale was o f  an article purchased under its 
paten t or other trade nam e.
74 [1936] A.C. 85.
75 [1969] 2 A.C. 31 (H L.).
76 For a further discussion on the question of merchantability, see: P.S. Atiyah, The 
Sale o f Goods (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1971) 4th ed., pp. 80-85; Ontario Law 
Reform Commission, Report On Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the 
Sale o f  Goods (Ontario: Department of Justice, 1972), pp. 36-41; K.J. Dorè, First 
Report o f the Consumer Protection Project (New Brunswick, Department of 
Justice, 1974) pp. 69-90.
77 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills [1936] A.C. 85 (per Lord Wright).
78 Freeman et al v. Consolidated Motors Ltd. (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 581 (Man. 
Q B ).
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(iv) Conclusion.
M any instances of  quality-re la ted  defects will not be sufficient 
to render them unfit for their  particular  purpose.
M erchantab ili ty  is m ore  likely to be of  assistance to the  buyer. 
Fitness for purpose does, however, provide an opportun ity  for a 
court or  judge to avoid an unjust result if  active concealm ent cannot 
be established, whereby the m axim  cavaet em p to r  would otherwise 
be applied against the purchaser. The m ajor  problems confronting a 
purchaser  seeking to apply the implied conditions o f  m erchantabili ty  
and fitness for purpose are:
(1) p roof  o f  sale by description;
(2) the dealer requirem ent;
(3) the vagueness of  the applicability o f  the term s themselves;
(4) the uncertainty whether the defect o f  quality is sufficient to 
render the goods unfit for purposes or unm erchantable .
D. THE D O C T R IN E  OF FRA UD.
T he  positive act of  concea lm ent is a fraudulent m isrepresen ta­
tion tha t  the goods a re  o f  the condition and quality tha t  they appear  
ex facie to be. If  an act can constitute  a m isrepresenta tion ,  so too 
should silence in approp r ia te  situations. In o ther  areas  o f  tort  law, 
an omission to act can am o u n t  to a breach o f  duty with resultant 
liability. “ M isrepresen ta tion”  is an unfortuna te  label to apply to 
such conduct by the vendor. It is a m isnom er and  may o f  itself be 
responsible for re ta rd ing  the expansion o f  concealm ent rules into the 
area  o f  non-disclosure.
The failure to impose a duty  to speak when it is reasonably a p ­
paren t tha t  the purchaser  is labouring under a deceptive belief 
am oun ts  to a licence to take  unfair advan tage  o f  others. It is really a 
fraud on the buyer. “ F ra u d ” would be a m ore  appropria te  te rm  than  
“ m isrepresen ta tion” and would be m ore conducive to expansion o f  
its rules into the area  of  non-disclosure. Such has been the ex­
perience in most A m erican  jurisdictions. T o  extend fraudulent con ­
cealm ent into the a rea  o f  non-disclosures would not m ean  tha t  the 
vendor thereby loses his right to secure the best possible bargain. It 
would not sanction the buyer’s recklessness. It means only that the 
seller shall be bound by the limits of reasonableness, fairness and 
honesty. Indeed, p roo f  of  the vendor’s fraud would be m ore difficult 
given the absence o f  any positive act of  concea lm ent and would con ­
sequently afford som e m easure  of  protection to the vendor.
The  A m erican  approach ,  although similar in m any respects, has 
differed from tha t  o f  C an ad ian  and English courts  in one im portan t  
area; namely, the duty to disclose. The distinction between mere 
silence and active concea lm ent by some trick or  contrivance also ex­
76 U.N.B.  L A W  J O U R N A L
ists in the com m on  law o f  the U nited  S ta te s .79 T here  is no duty  to 
speak even when it is appa ren t  th a t  the purchaser  is m is taken so long 
as it is a m a tte r  on which either party  m ay exercise his independent 
jud g m e n t .80 Unlike  C a n a d a  or G rea t  Britain, however, most 
A m erican  courts  impose an obligation o f  full disclosure whenever 
fair conduct dem ands  it.81 Fair  conduct norm ally  requires disclosure 
when the vendor possesses special knowledge which affects the  value 
or desirability of  the property  or goods offered for sale and the 
vendee has no such knowledge and no reasonable m eans of  acquiring 
such knowledge.82 In Jenkins v. M cCormick  the following proposi­
tion is expounded:
Where parties deal at arm ’s length and their relations are not confidential, 
silence is not fraud, especially where facts are equally within means of 
knowledge by both parties or particularly within knowledge of one party 
and of such a nature that other has no right to expect information, but, if 
fact concealed is peculiarly within knowledge o f  one party and o f such a 
nature that other party is justified in assuming its nonexistence, there is a 
duty of disclosure, and deliberate suppression of such fact is fraud 
[emphasis added)83.
Although this concept applies generally to all con tracts  between 
parties dealing at a r m ’s length, it has seen its greatest application in 
contracts  for the sale o f  land. In Williams v. Benson84 the M ichigan 
C our t  o f  Appeal found the vendor o f  a te rm ite  infested house liable 
for fraudulent concealm ent o f  tha t  fact purely by virtue o f  its non­
disclosure:
...we hold that where a vendor has knowledge of the past or present ex­
istence of an instrumentality of progressive destruction or substantial im­
pairment, notwithstanding reason to believe that the progression has been 
halted, a duty to disclose the circumstances arises... [T] he doctrines of 
Michigan law amalgamate to the point where a full disclosure of such basic 
defects as the termite infestation...sewage disposal problem...erosion...re­
quire full disclosure and caveat emptor has no place. Silence as to the ex­
istence or pre-existence of such known instrumentalities of progressive 
destruction or substantial .impairment, even absent specific inquiry, can 
create liability...(emphasis added)
79 See: 37Am. Jur. 2d 198, s 145 et seq.
80 Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co. (1888), 128 U.S. 383, 9 S. Ct. 101 (U.S. 
Circuit Ct., Nebraska).
81 Cohen v. Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank (1956) 300 p. 2d 14 (Cai. Ap- 
p.) per Moore J.; Nowicki v. Padgorski (I960), 101 N.W. 2d 371 (Mich. S.C.).
82 Cohen v. Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank, supra, n. 80 Central Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Schmidt (1957), 313 p. 2d 132 (Cal. App.); Parker v. Green (1966), 340 
S.W. 2d 435 (Mo. App.); Wolf v. Brungardt (1974), 524 p. 2d 726, (Kan. S.C.); 
U.S. Fibres Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz Inc. (1973), 358 F. Supp. 467 (D.C. 
Mich.); Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Co. (1961), 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 
App.).
83 (1959), 339 P. 2d 8 (Kan S .C.), Jackson J. see also: Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods 
Inc. (1965), 399 P. 2d 822 Kan. S.C.).
84 (1966), 141 N.W. 2d 650 at 656 (Mich. C.A.) per Fitzgerald J.
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This is certainly a p ragm atic  expansion o f  the com m on law as it has 
been applied in C anad ian  Courts .
The A m erican  view tha t  disclosure o f  m ateria l facts affecting 
quality  or value m ust be disclosed by the seller if (1) the seller posses­
ses som e special knowledge and (2) the purchaser  does no t possess 
tha t  knowledge and canno t reasonably  be expected to acquire that 
knowledge, has som e practical d raw backs.  Since there is no positive 
act indicating a fraudulent intent, p roo f  of  fraud can be very 
onerous. The  C our t  m ust be satisified by a “ clear, convincing and 
sa tisfac tory”  p reponderance o f  evidence before it will ascribe a 
f raudulent intention to the vendor’s non-disclosure.85 The C ourt 
m ay be reluctant to find tha t  the vendor possessed special knowledge 
to which the purchaser  has no reasonable means of  access. In 
Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc.*h for example, the plaintiff 
purchased a deep freeze unit from the defendant on a food plan 
p rogram  whereby the p la intiff  expected he would save his family a 
considerable food expense. However, the scheme did not prove to be 
the saving that he had hoped. The plaintiff  claimed tha t  the defen­
dan t was under a duty  to disclose how much a purchaser  could be ex­
pected to save on food bills. The  S up rem e C our t  o f  Kansas rejected 
the p la in t i f f s  contention. W here  goods are open to the inspection of  
the  buyer, he is presum ed to be as com peten t to  judge to their value 
as the seller. The court felt that the p la intiff  could have shopped 
around  to com pare  food prices to determ ine how much he could save 
(or lose) under the scheme offered by the defendant.  While this case 
did not deal with quality defects per se, it points out the difficulties 
associated with the rule of  disclosure where the vendor possesses 
special knowledge as tha t  rule has been expressed in the United 
S tates. W h a t  constittues an unfair bargaining advantage will fall to 
be determ ined  by the peculiar facts of  each case.
CONCLUSION
By misplacing its em phasis  on the right to inspect goods and 
p ioperty  ra ther  than on a s tandard  o f  conscionability in contractual 
bargaining, the com m on law has produced an illogical inconsistency: 
the distinction between active concealm ent and mere acquiescence 
in the buyer’s m is take as to the quality o f  the goods or property. A 
m ore  just approach  would be to require a vendor to  disclose all 
m ateria l quality-re la ted  defects known to  him before risk in the 
goods passes to the buyer. The m ateria lity  o f  the defect would have 
to be determ ined  objectively by asking whether a reasonable buyer, 
fully acquain ted  with the facts, would have entered into the t ransac­
85 Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc. (1965), 399 P. 2d 822, (Kan. S.C.), Schroeder J.
86 Ibid.
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tion or,  if so, at a greatly reduced price. The best solution may lie in 
resort to s ta tu tory  enactm ents  defining and informing both parties of 
their  respective rights and obligations as well as expanding the 
remedies offered to an aggrieved as well as expanding the remedies 
offered to an aggrieved purchaser. Such legislation should not be 
restricted to the field o f  consum er goods but include contracts  for 
new business opportunities and for the purchase and sale o f  real es­
tate.
